_The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church
               by Heinrich Schmid, D.D.
               Third edition, revised
               Translated from German and Latin
                    by
               Charles A. Hay, D.D.
                    and
               Henry E. Jacobs, D.D.
               Copyright 1875 and 1889, Charles A. Hay
               and Henry E. Jacobs
               Copyright 1899, Henry E. Jacobs
               and Charles E. Hay
               Reprinted 1961 by
               Augsburg Publishing House_
               Pages 673-675
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			APPENDIX.

		_______________________

			   II.

			EXPLANATION

		OF SOME SCHOLASTICO-DOGMATIC TERMS.

[Translated from Luthardt's Compendium der Dogmatik, p. 302, sqq.]

Circumscriptiva praesentia, contrasted with definitiva prae-
sentia, or in Scholastic usage (Occam) diffinitiva (disfinere):
the former used with reference to bodies, in so far as their
single parts correspond to the single parts of [occupied] space,
and thus are locally limited; the latter, of spiritual existences
(or pneumatic bodies, such as the body of Christ in the Lord's 
Supper), in so far as they stand in such a relation to a specific
space that they are entirely present at each point of it, as the
soul in the body, and angels at the respective places of their
presence and activity.

Concretum designates the unity of substance (subjectum) and
form (i.e., that distinction in view of which the substance is
designated). Thus, the concretum person designates the person
together with its nature; the concretum nature designates
nature viewed in its personal existence; whilst the abstractum
nature designates nature viewed in itself, aside from personal
existence, as humanity, Deity, human nature, divine nature.

Connexa are such conceptions or objects as reciprocally
necessitate each other, so that they cannot be conceived of
without each other; as, e.g., Creator and creature. Hence
they are designated as related.

Connotata, are relative conceptions that imply others corre-
sponding to them (connotare, i.e., innuere or indigitare): a
father implies a son; a son implies a father.
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Distinctio rationis rationantis signifies a purely subjective
logical distinction, not objectively founded upon the thing
itself; whilst distinctio rationis ratiocinatae signifies a dis-
tinction that is, indeed, only conceived, but conceived with a
factual basis. Compare the doctrine of the Divine Attributes.

Essentialiter.--A predicate is said to belong essentially to a
subject (or a substance) if the latter cannot, according to its
nature, at all exist or be conceived of without the former; as,
e.g., man is essentially rational. A predicate is said to belong
accidentally to a subject, if the latter can be conceived of inde-
pendently of the former; as, e.g., the accidental attributes of
roundness, whiteness, etc.

Forma is the more specific definiteness that imparts to a
subject, in itself indifferent, its characteristic peculiarity; or it
is the conception of anything existing in a definite manner.
Thus, in the sphere of morals, actions in themselves indifferent
receive through the intention of the actor their forma, i.e.,
their specific character of virtue or vice. In this sense
Scholasticism speaks of a fides formata caritate (a faith formed
by love), or the Dogmaticians say: Concurrit Deus ad mate-
riale non ad formale peccati (God concurs as to the matter,
not as to the form, of sin). The same mode of conception
underlies the Aristotelian and scholastic definition of the soul:
Anima est forma corporis (Aristotle: the soul is entelecheia somatos
organikou, or eidos somatos phusikou zoen echontos, i.e., the
specifying formal principle of organized matter). Thus also, e.g.,
religion, considered materialiter, is conceived of as religion
taken as a whole; considered formaliter, it is conceived of as
specific religious knowledge or profession. Or, it is said, also,
Mary is the Mother of God, not formally, i.e., inasmuch as she did
not bring forth God, as God according to His Deity; but materi-
ally, inasmuch as she brought forth Him who is true God.

Habitudo designates, in contrast with existence or the thing
itself, the reference to, or capacity for, some other thing. Thus,
between God and man there is a relation [or correspondence]
not of entitas (for as to their existence they are infinitely 
different), but of habitudo (for they have a reference to each
other).

Habitus is the condition [or state of being] which includes
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in itself at the same time a power to act. This habitus may
be infused (wrought by God), and thus is the condition [sine
qua non] of all corresponding activity; or acquired, and then
it is the result of actions already performed. Comp. habitual
and actual sin.

Qualitas is used either in a wider sense, for every attribute,
or in a narrower sense, to designate the essential peculiarities
of anything.

Relatio is the relation of one thing to another. Ens rela-
tivum is, therefore, something that cannot be conceived of
without something else (e.g., master, like, etc.), as contrasted
with ens absolutum (e.g., man).

Subsistentia designates an independent existence (suppositum),
which carries the source of its acitivity within itself. When
applied to a rational being (suppositum in the sense of person),
it designates, therefore, personality. Thus, e.g., every angel,
man, brute, etc., has its subsistentia, while the body and the
soul, considered as separated from each other, have no sub-
sistentia of their own, and are not a suppositum, but only a pars
suppositi. Therefore, in the case of God, the immediatio sup-
positi (of His existence) i.e., His ad essentia ad creaturas sub-
stantialis [His substantial nearness to creatures] is distin- 
guished from the immediatio virtutis, i.e. of His operatio
[activity].

Sustantia completa is an existence that is not a part of a
whole, but constitutes a whole in itself (e.g., man, tree, etc.);
substantia incompleta is a partial substance, which serves to
complete another (body, soul of man while the angels are
spiritus completi). The substance needs subsistence to render
it a substantia completa (therefore man becomes such only
through personality), according to the well-known definition
of Augustine (De Trin., VII, 4, 9): Sicut ab eo quod est esse
appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est subsitere substantiam
dicimus. (Just as anything is called an essence from the fact
of its existence, so anything is called a substance from the fact
of its subsistence.)
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