_The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church
			by Heinrich Schmid, D.D.
			Third edition, revised
			Translated from German and Latin
				by
			Charles A. Hay, D.D.
				and
			Henry E. Jacobs, D.D.
			Copyright 1875 and 1889, Charles A. Hay
			and Henry E. Jacobs
			Copyright 1899, Henry E. Jacobs
			and Charles E. Hay
			Reprinted 1961 by
			Augsburg Publishing House_
			Pages 103-129
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
			PART I.

			OF GOD.

PARA. 14. Division of the Subject.

The chief design of the creation of man, and that of revela-
tion also, is, that God may be known. [1] Theology,
therefore, must begin with the doctrine concerning God. [2]

The doctrine concerning God may be divided into (1) The
doctrine of the existence, the nature, and the attributes of God.
(2) The doctrine of the particular manner in which God sub-
sists, i.e., the doctrine of God as triune. (3) The doctrine of
the works of God, i.e., of Creation. (4) The doctrine of the
manner in which God preserves His works and cares for them,
i.e., the doctrine of Providence. (5) The doctrine of the
angels, as the ministering beings among the works of God.
		-------------------------
			CHAPTER I.

			OF GOD.

PARA. 15. Preliminary Statement. The Natural and Supernatural
		Knowledge of God.

The full and saving knowledge of God we obtain, of course,
only from revelation. But aside from this there exists a
knowledge of God, for we find it even among the heathen.
We can therefore distinguish a twofold source from which the
knowledge of God may be derived, the one, the volume of
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Nature, and the other, the volume of the Scriptures; and the
knowledge of God is accordingly both natural, and revealed
or supernatural. [3]

The natural knowledge is either innate or acquired, i.e., a
certain knowledge of God is inborn, and this can be expanded
and further confirmed by the contemplation of the works and
ways of God in nature and history. [4] The knowledge thus
arising, though in itself true, may nevertheless be corrupted
and changed into error through the moral depravity existing
in man; [5] it is at best very imperfect, making known indeed
something concerning God, e.g., His existence and somewhat
of His attributes and will, but this never in its entire extent,
and never in such manner as to give to man an absolute cer-
tainty, so as to furnish a trustworthy guide for his faith and
life; [6] much less does it suffice to secure his salvation. [7]
The reason of this imperfection lies, however, in the depravity
of human nature, which, since its fall, can no longer lift itself
up to a perfect knowledge of God. All knowledge thus de-
rived we must therefore regard as the remnant of a knowledge
which, but for the Fall, we would have possessed in full meas-
ure. [8] It serves, accordingly, rather to awaken in us a long-
ing after true and perfect knowledge (cognitio paedagogica), and
in some measure to regulate our moral deportment, even be-
fore the knowledge communicated by revelation has reached
us (cognitio paedeutica); and it can also be profitably employed
along with the revealed knowledge (cognitio didactica). [9] We
still need revelation, therefore, in order to acquire full and
true knowledge. [10]

[1] GRH. (III, 1): "That this doctrine concerning God is neces-
sary, is proved (1) by the design for which man was created. Just
as all things else were created on account of man, so man was
brought into being in order rightly to know and worship, to love
and honor God his Creator....(2) By the design for which
God reveals Himself. God, coming forth from the hidden seat of
His majesty, not only in the creation of the world, but also and
most of all in the revelation of His Word, out of His boundless
goodness unto men reveals Himself, surely with no other aim than
that men may rightly know God through this revelation, and may
preserve and hand down to their posterity the true doctrine con-
cerning God, free from any intermixture of error and in its integ-
---------------------End of Page 104------------------------------
ty." [MEL. begins his Loci of 1542: "For this end man was
created and redeemed, that he might be the image and temple of
God, to proclaim God's praises."]

[2] GRH. (ibid.): "As the Holy Scriptures are the only source
of knowledge in Theology, so God, boundless in goodness, supreme
in power, is the only and absolute source of existence, not only
with reference to the Holy Scriptures themselves (in which the
Word of God or the divine revelation is contained), but also with
reference to the divine works concerning which Theology treats.
The centre of all Scripture, the nucleus of Theology, the end and
aim of our knowledge and desire, all these are one and the same.
We pass, therefore, in convenient order, from the article concern-
ing the Scriptures to the article concerning the Nature of God and
the Divine Attributes."

QUEN. (I, 250): "The chief end of man and of all Theology is
God, and the knowledge, worship, and enjoyment of God; with the
doctrine concerning Him, therefore, we properly begin, when The-
ology is teated after the manner of a practical discipline."

HOLL. (187): "As Theology is a practical science, we are first
of all to treat of its design. But as the aim of Theology is twofold,
in part objective, that is, the infinitely perfect and supremely
beneficent God, and partly formal, that is, the beholding and
beatific fruition of God; so the objective end of Theology, namely,
God, who thoroughly satisfies the desire of man, is first to be con-
sidered."

[3] GRH. (I, 93): "Two things lead to the knowledge of God:
the creature and the Scripture (Augustine)."

HOLL. (188): "The knowledge of God is sought both by the
light of Nature or Reason, and by the light of Revelation."

[4] QUEN. (I, 251): "The natural knowledge of God is that by
which man, without any special revelation, may know of himself,
though very imperfectly, by the light of Nature and from the Book
of Nature, that there is some supreme Divinity, that He, by His
own wisdom and power, controls this whole universe, and that He
has brought all things into being."

GRH. (I, 93): "Innate knowledge is that common conception
concerning God engraven and impressed upon the mind of every
man by Nature, and hence from the womb, as though from prin-
ciples born within us or koinais ennoiais (which are nothing else than
certain remains and ereipia of the divine image, sparks and scintilla-
tions of that clear ligfht which shone with full splendor in the mind
of man before the fall), which also embrace some knowledge of God;
as, that He is one, good, etc." (III, 42): "These scintillations
----------------End of Page 105-------------------------------------
therefore we refer to that internal Book of Nature, to which also
belongs the book suneideseos, the internal testimony of conscience,
which the scholastics call synteresis; for from principles born within
us there arises in the heart of every one this practical syllogism:
`He who leads an impious life shall experience the wrath and
punishment of a divine judge.' The reason of this lies in that
which is by nature engraven upon all, i.e., that there is a God,
that God is to be worshiped, that God is the avenger of crimes.
The conscience of the guilty adds: `I have led a wicked life.'"

(Id., III, 42): "Natural knowledge is acquired by the human
mind from the external Book of Nature, i.e., from the contempla-
tion of the divine effects and ways, by the exercise of its natural
powers." As such effects of the divine agency, GRH. enumerates
(I, 94): "(1) The creation of things visible. (2) The variety,
beauty, and order of created things. (3) The supporting, govern-
ing, and preserving of created things. (4) The profuse betow-
ment of the various gifts which minister to the necessities of man
and other living beings. (5) The notice and retribution of the
avenging eye and hand of God. (5) The working of miracles.
(7) The foretelling of future events. (8) The periodical overthrow
of kingdoms. (9) The nature of the human mind. (10) The
fragments of natural knowledge, and among these the distinction
of good and evil. (11) The terrors, gnawings, and stings of con-
science. (12) The series of efficient and final causes."

[Mel. (Loci, 1542) cites as proofs of the Divine existence: 1.
The order of Nature, which could not have arisen or be maintained
by accident, or have arisen from matter. The perpetuity of species,
e.g., that men are born of men, and cattle of cattle, is cited as one
illustration. 2. The nature of the human mind. A senseless and
irrational thing cannot be the cause of an intelligent nature. 3.
Moral distinctions made universally by men. These could not
have originated from matter. 4. The universality of the testi-
mony to God's existence. 5. Terrors of conscience, implying
a Supreme Judge. 7. Organization of political society, which
could not have arisen accidentally, but points to a divine mind,
implanting within man the capacity and laws of order. 7. The
series of efficient causes implying a First Cause. If the series were
infinite, there would be no order among the causes, and none
would necessarily cohere. 8. Final causes prove a designing mind.
Everything in Nature is arranged with reference to an end.]

[GRH. (III, 4) recapitulates proofs of philosophers and scholas-
tics: 1. The series of moving objects in this world implies a First
Mover. 2. The order of efficient causes implies a First Cause. 3.
--------------------End of Page 106---------------------------------
The different degrees of good imply a Supreme Standard. 4. The
direction of all things, even those that are irrational, towards a
certain end. 5. The natural inclination of all men to believe that
there is a Governor of the Universe, whom they call God. This is
illustrated by the fact that, in sudden dangers, when men recog-
nize the impotency of human aid, they instinctively resort to
prayer.]

QUEN.  (I, 253): "The natural knowledge of God is twofold;
partly emphutos, or by nature impressed upon the minds of men in
their very origin, innate and implanted, by which men recognize God
through certain principles born within them, as it were by certain
fragments and remains of the divine image, without any research
or operation of the mind; partly epiktetos, or acquired, because it is
evolved through the inborn principles of nature through a process
of reasoning and the accurate contemplation of created things, or
gathered from the works of God in creation and those traces of
divinity which are scattered throughout the universe. The former
is called subjective; the latter, objective. The former all men, even
infants, possess; but the latter is not found in all. The former is
propagated by generation; the latter by the instruction of others, or
also by personal culture and investigation. The former may be
called constitutional knowledge, for it belongs to us after the manner
of a constitutional tendency, even before the use and exercise of
reason; the latter, actual, because it exerts itslef and is obtained by
reasoning and research." Compare also the remark of GRH. (III,
46): "Finally, we observe, that when Ostorodus says that men do
not obtain whatever knowledge they have of God or of divinity
from nature, or from the contemplation of created things, but alone
by hearing and from the teaching of others, the word, "hearing,"
is ambiguous. For if Ostorodus means that for all knowledge
of God there is required a special manifestation of God through the
Word, this we totally deny; but, if by the word, hearing, be under-
stood the doctrine and precepts derived from our ancestors, who
followed nature alone as a teacher, then we say that this, no less
than the principles connate with us, and also the contemplation of
created things, belongs to natural knowledge. But, although the
arguments are distinct by which we demonstrate as well the innate
as the acquired natural knowledge of God; yet, when the Photini-
ans deny both, it is sufficient for us to prove against them that
there is some natural knowledge of God, from whatever source de-
rived, whether from natural instinct, or intuition, or the instruction
of others, who have followed Nature alone as a teacher."

CAL., in opposition to the Socinians, thus sums up the proposi-
---------------------------End of Page 107-------------------------
tions in regard to the natural knowledge of God: "(1) That man,
distitute of the revealed Word of God, can attain, by the use of
sound reason, to some knowledge concerning God, His being and
His general will or providence. (II, 61) (2) That not only the
faculty or the power of knowing God, but also a certain knowledge
of God, belongs to us by nature. (II, 73) (3) Although there
does not belong to man a knowledge of God before the use and ex-
ercise of reason, so far as concerns a distinct notion or mental con-
ception, yet we think it cannot be denied that there exists in man
a certain disposition, or a kind of constitutional tendency, a certain
teleiosis of intellectual power left in man after the Fall, by the use
of which man can, to some extent, recognize God without the help
of a teacher. (II, 80.) (4) That it is known to man, not only
naturally, but also per se, that there is a God." (II, 86.)

The proof for the existence of an innate knowledge is drawn from
Rom. 1:19, and 2:14, 15; also from the following reasons: "(1)
From the connate distinction between good and evil that is stamped
upon the minds of all; (2) From the dread of a supreme divinity
naturally springing up in the hearts of men; (3) From the terrors
of an evil conscience and the cheerfulness and security of a good
conscience; (4) From the torments of conscience on account of a
crime committed....(5) From the unanimous consent of all
nations; (6) From the secret inclination of all to some form of re-
ligion; (7) From moral precepts drawn from the light of nature."
(QUEN. I, 253.)

The acquired knowledge is proved from Rom. 1:20; Acts 17:27.

[5] QUEN. (I, 253): "That the natural knowledge of God is
true, is evident from this, that the apostle expressly calls it aletheia,
Rom. 1:18 sq., and with the addition, aletheian tou theou, v. 25, as
that which springs from the original truth; where, nevertheless, we
must distinguish between the natural knowledge of God, considered
in and through itself, and in so far as it has united with it imper-
fection, corruption of reason, and a proclivity to various errors.
Viewed in the former light it is true, viewed in the latter it is
mingled through accident with falsehood."

[6] CAL. (II, 47): "The imperfection of the natural knowledge
of God as to those things which are revealed in nature, and its
nullity as to the supernatural mysteries of faith."

QUEN. (I, 253): "The natural knowledge of God is imperfect
mainly in two respects: (1) as regards its object, this being either
altogether unknown (and here belongs the Gospel, which is a
mystery hidden from the ages), or not fully known (and here be-
longs the doctrine of the Law, which man knows from natural
----------------------End of Page 108----------------------------------
sources only in part); (2) As regards its subject, either not recog-
nizing God with sufficient constancy, or sometimes doubting con-
cerning Him in consequence of congenital corruption."

CHMN. (Loci, I, 20): "The natural knowledge of God either
amounts to nothing, or is imperfect, or languid. It amounts to
nothing, since all philosophy knows nothing whatever of the
gratuitous promise of the forgiveness of sins; for the Son of God
has revealed this to the Church from the bosom of the Eternal
Father, John 1:18; Matt. 11:27; 1 Cor. 1:21; 2:7. It is imper-
fect, for the heathen know only a small portion of the Law; but of
the inner worship of the First Table, reason neither knows not de-
termines anything for certain. Heathen philosophers teach of only
external and civil topics, mingling with them many foolish para-
doxes, concerning which there is among them no agreement. It is
languid, for although the fact that God exists and requires obe-
dience is impressed upon men's minds, nevertheless, the assent to
this is not only feeble, but is often shaken by horrid doubts. An
apt illustration is found in the Tusculan Disputations, where
Cicero, discussing with Antony the immortality of the soul, says:
`Read diligently Plato's treatise concerning the immortality of the
soul. Nothing will be left for you to desire.' `This I have done
frequently,' Antony replies; `but, somehow or other, as long as I
read I assent, but whenever I lay aside the volume and begin to
reflect concerning the immortality of the soul, all my assent glides
away.'"

In regard to the substance of what is known by the light of
nature, QUEN. (I, 255): "The controversy here is not whether
man, naturally or without revelation, can recognize to ti esti, what
and who is the true God, according to all the peculiarities of the
divine nature; and whether he can naturally fully understand His
providence and His special will in the government of the Church
and in the eternal salvation of men: for all these things are to be
sought only through the revealed Word. But the question is
whether man can naturally know to hoti, whether God be, and in general
recognize what that Divine Being is, who is the cause of all things
in nature, who is just, good, holy, is to be worshiped, etc.; and
so, whether man without a revelation can have any adequate
knowledge concerning the true God or any true conceptions con-
cerning God, although in particular he may apply them improp-
erly, as e.g., to that which is not truly God."

With the last remark from Quenstedt compare the statement of
Gerhard (I, 96): "We must distinguish between the conception
of God, derived by the heathen mind from the contemplation of
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His creatures, and the application of that conception; the former is
legitimate, the latter is far from being so. For, although they de-
rive the conception of eternal power and divinity...from the
Book of Nature, yet they do not rightly apply it to the one Jehovah,
...but they ascribe the same to irrational animals, serpents,
reptiles, etc.; and inasmuch as they of their own accord devise a
method of worship, they thereby worship the imagination of their
own hearts and not the true God."

Through the light of nature man attains, therefore, only "a par-
tial knowledge concerning the power, wisdom, goodness and providence
of God." GRH. (III, 60): "Man has been deprived of the knowl-
edge of God, so far as the integrity of natural knowledge is concerned,
for the greater part of it has been obliterated from his mind by sin;
so far as its purity is concerned, for the knowledge yet remaining is
very much obscured; and, in view also of the peculiar wickedness
of certain persons."

[7] QUEN. (I, 261): "The natural knowledge of God is not
adequate to secure everlasting life, nor has any mortal ever been
redeemed, nor can any one ever be redeemed, by it alone. Acts
4:12; Rom. 10:18; Mark 16:16; Gal. 3:11; Eph. 4:18; Gal. 4:8;
Eph. 2:12."

MEL. (I, 9): "Although, in some way, the human mind comes
to the knowledge of the fact that God punishes the guilty, never-
theless concerning reconciliation it knows nothing without the
revelation of the divine promise."

[8] QUEN. (I, 254): "We must distinguish between the natural
knowledge of God, viewed in its original integrity, and the same in
its fragmentary remains; the former is a perfect theongnosia, constitut-
ing a part of the mental condition of our first parents, as graciously
created; the latter, on the other hand, is a partial and imperfect
knowledge of God, still inherent in our corrupt nature since the
Fall. It is as it were a little spark of primeval light, a small drop
from a vast ocian, or an atom of the ashes of a splendid house in
ruins."

[9] CHMN. (Loci, Part I, 21): "The reasons why God imparted
the external knowlege of Himself to the minds of all men are:
(1) For the sake of external discipline, which God wished to be
exercised by all men, even the unregenerate; (2) that God might
be sought after (Acts 17:27-30);...(3) that He might render
men inexcusable (Rom. 1:20)."

CAL. (II, 40): "The use of the natural knowledge of God is (1)
Paedagogical, for seeking after the true God, who has manifested
Himself through the Scriptures in the Church; (2) Paedeutical, for
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directing morals and external discipline both within and without
the Church; (3) Didactic, because it contributes to the exposition
and illustration of the Scriptures, if it be rightly employed."
(Also II, 51): "The use of this doctrine (i.e., the topic concern-
ing the natural knowledge of God) is that we may understand
whether we can by nature know anything of God, or what and
how much we can thus know; lest we either deny those things
which are naturally manifest, or ascribe too much importance to
them: also, that we gratefully recognize this manifestation and
cultivate this natural knowledge as the Book of Nature is daily un-
folded, and do not suppress it, or abuse it, but duly unite the Book
of Nature with the Book of Scripture, and finally be confirmed and
stimulated by the teaching and example of those who have applied
themselves to the study of truth and virtue as here exhibited and
illustrated."

[10] QUEN. (I, 268): "The supernatural or revealed knowledge
of God is that saving knowledge of the triune God and of divine
things, drawn from the written word of God, which has flourished
from the beginning of the Church and was ordained for human
salvation."

CHMN. (Loci Th., I, 22): "The saving knowledge of God
through which we obtain eternal life, is that revealed through the
Word, in which God makes known Himself and His will. To this
revelation, God has bound His Church, which knows, worships,
and glorifies God only as He has revealed Himself in this Word,
so that in this way the true and only Church of God may be dis-
tinguished from all heathen religions."

PARA. 16. (1). The Certainty of the Divine Existence.

Although the divine existence is postulated in the natural
human consciousness, which furnishes many proofs of it, [1]
yet we become perfectly certain of it only through revelation.
[2]

PARA. 17. (2.) The Essence of God.

Our knowledge of the essence of God (quid sit Deus) is also
mainly derived from revelation, for the Holy Scriptures give
us in His names, attributes, and works a description of God
Himself. [3] And with the knowledge thus derived we must
be satisfied, for we know concerning the essence of God noth-
ing more, and nothing more specific, than what the Holy
Scriptures teach. We acquire, indeed, from this source no
----------------End of Page 111-----------------------------
adequate and complete knowledge of the essence of God; for
this transcends our powers of comprehension, and for this
reason the Scriptures declare the incomprehensibility of the
divine essence. (1 Tim. 6:16; 1 John 3:2; Rom. 11:33.)
But we may very well be content with the knowledge imparted
to us through the Holy Scripture, as we nevertheless learn
therefrom as much about God and His essence as is needful
for our salvation. [4]

From what has been said, it is manifest in what sense God
may be defined. He cannot be literally defined, i.e., we can-
not express in words what God is as to His essence, what He
is in Himself, because no adequate conception can be formed
of Him; but a definition of God, in a wider sense, may never-
theless be given, in so far, namely, as, upon the authority of
the Holy Scriptures, a description of God may be presented,
according to which we can most clearly distinguish between
Him and other essences. [5]

Upon the authority of the description of God given in the
Holy Scriptures, we can thus define Him as an Infinite
Spiritual Essence. [6]

[1] See above, PARA. 15, Note 4.

[2] GRH. (III, 40): "To some it may seem that this question
in the Church is superfluous, since it is known and conceded by
all that God exists, and there is no people, however barbarous,
that denies that God exists, and that He is to be worshiped
(though it may not know how to worship Him), and so the
knowledge of God is naturally innate in all....But, neverthe-
less, we must prove that God exists, (1) for the confutation of
those who deny that there is a God; (2) for the confirmation of
our faith (...in great and severe temptations, says Chemnitz,
we are all either Epicureans or Stoics; our mind must therefore be
established by the consideration of the arguments which prove that
there is a God, and that He exercises a providential care over
human affairs); (3) for the perfecting of natural knowledge
(...since the natural knowledge of God is imperfect and
languid, and so must be confirmed, widened, and deepened from
the Word divinely revealed.")

[3] CAL. (II, 110): "That God exists, special scriptural state-
ments testify, especially those which communicate His names,
words, and works."
-----------------------End of Page 112----------------------------
GRH. (III, 14): "To synonymics belong the names of God, in
the exposition of which the principal part of the doctrine concern-
ing God consists, because our theology in this life is almost wholly
grammatical, whence whatever we may know concerning God is
called a name of God....The names of God are general or
special. In a general and wide sense, a name of God is whatever is
predicated of God; thus the term was employed by the ancients,
who, under the designation of names, embraced also the attributes
or characteristics."

QUEN. (I, 268): "In determining the question what God is, we
must first consider the divine names, some of which, either in view
of their etymology or from the manner in which they are used in
Scripture, indicate the essence of God and are commonly called
essential, as Jehovah, Jah, Elohim; others are derived from the
divine attributes, as when God is called omnipotent, just, wise;
others from the divine works, as when He is called Creator, Pre-
server, etc."

[4] CHMN. (Loci Th., I, 24): "As we are not to think of God
otherwise than as He has revealed Himself in the Word He has
given, these questions (concerning the essence and the will of God)
have certain prescribed limits, within which the human mind,
comtemplating God, must confine itself. For dangerous errors
have arisen on this subject, for no other reason than because the
point of view was not rightly taken, or because human curiosity in
this discussion wandered farther than was meet."

SELN. (I, 53): "It has been said that we ought to be content
with the descriptions of God which are given by God Himself."

ID. (I, 51): "Hilary says: We understand that only that is to
be heartily believed concerning God, in reference to which He him-
self authoritatively testifies that it is to be believed concerning
Him. What, therefore, God is absolutely, and what is His nature
and substance, we know that no one can state, imagine, compre-
hend, or declare by an essential definition, either by any dialectic
reasoning or by the keenness of the human intellect. For, since
neither eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the
heart of man the things which God has prepared for those that
love Him, how much less can the dulness of the human mind
grasp God Himself? Whence many are accustomed to say, that
it is easier to define what God is not, than what He is."

Thus GRH. says (III, 15) of the divine majesty: "The variety
of divine names expresses the divine majesty. For since, in con-
sequence of its infinite perfection, the divine majesty cannot be
fully recognized by us, therefore so many divine names are given
------------------End of Page 113-----------------------------------
in the Scriptures, that from these we may be led to something like
a suitable recognition of the divine majesty."

BR. (173): "It must be confessed that in this life we may not
have a specific, proper, and adequate conception, well-defined and
clear, of the divine essence; for we know but in part."

[5] Thus already CHMN. asks (Loc. Th., I, 25), after the ex-
ample of the Scholastics: "If a definition must explain the nature
of the thing defined so as to lead the mind, as it were, into the very
thing itself, how then can God be defined?"--and answers; "The
reply is easy: It is indeed true, concerning our knowledge of God
in this life (1 Cor. 13:12), that `we see through a glass, darkly;'
and so in the definition it is said, `He is of immense wisdom and
power,' i.e., God is greater than we can imagine or declare....
But, in examining the definition we do not scrutinize those mys-
teries of the essence and will of God which He wishes us to be
ignorant of; but we gather a brief statement from what God has
Himself revealed to us in His Word concerning His essence and
will. And, since God surely wishes to be recognized and wor-
shiped as He has revealed Himself, that description of God is to
be held, to which the mind reverts in prayer; for adoration is
nothing but a confession, whereby we ascribe to the essence ad-
dressed in prayer all the attributes comprised in the definiton.
There is, therefore, a name of God occult and hidden, which is not
to be searched out. There is, however, also a name of God made
known that He wishes to be recognized, spoken about, praised,
and worshiped."

GRH. (III, 70) therefore distinguishes: "(1) Between a perfect
definition, which exactly conforms to the accuracy of logical rules,
and a description drawn from the Scriptures. (2) Between
knowledge and comprehension. That is comprehended which is
perfectly known; that is perfectly known which is known so far as
it can be known. We know God, indeed, but we do not compre-
hend Him, i.e., we do not perfectly know Him, because He is
infinite. Here we must note, however, that the knowledge of God
derived from the Word is called perfect, as well by reason of its end,
for it is sufficient for salvation, as by way of comparison with
natural knowledge, which is very obscure and imperfect. (3)
Between the knowledge of God in this and in another life....
The latter, or intuitive definition is the most perfect of all, for we
shall then see God in the future life, face to face.... (4) A nom-
inal definition may be given, but not an essential one."

CAL. (II, 142) distinguishes in the same way between a defini-
tion rigidly taken and a definition broadly applied.
----------------End of Page 114-----------------------------------
GRH. (III, 68) proves the inadmissibility of a definiton in the 
strict sense: "(1) From the want of a genus. That of which there
is no true and proper logical genus cannot be defined, because the
genus is an essential part of a definition. But God has no true
and proper logical genus; because, if there were such a genus, that
would be in the same terms essentially and equally predicated of
God and of creatures, which cannot be done, because God as the
Creator and the creature are separated from each other by an infi-
nite interval, and there is nothing that can be equally predicated
of both. (2) From the divine perfection. God is the supreme
Being, so He has nothing beyond Him; but whatever is properly
defined is defined through something going before... (3)
From a sufficient enumeration. If God may be properly defined,
that would be either an essential or a causal definition. Essential
it could not be, because that consists in genus and specific differ-
entia. But God has no name of the same genus with other beings,
nor is His most simple essence composed of genus and differentia.
Neither can it be a causal definition, sinc God is the cause of all
things, but of God there is no cause."

[6] This position is taken by Calovius, Quenstedt, Koenig;
while others, as Baier (173), Hollazius (229), thus define: "God
is a spiritual Being, subsisting of Himself; or, more concisely:
God is an independent Spirit."

The individual terms are explained as follow:

(1) BR. (172): "By the term divine essence is meant that which
is first thought of in God, and through which God is adequately
distinguished from all other things, and which, in our mode of
conception, is the root and source of all the perfections which, as
attributes, are ascribed to God."

(2) QUEN. (I, 284): "The term spiritual essence is a common
conception. For the term essence is common to God and creatures,
but belongs to God originally and independently, to creatures
secondarily and by way of dependence. And the term spirit also
is analogically predicated of God and angels, and also of the souls
of men." (The difference that is observed when these two terms
are predicated of God and of creatures respectively, is still more
accurately indicated in the statement: "Essence, substance, spirit,
and consequently the remaining attributes which are acribed at
the same time to God and to creatures, are predicated of God and
of rational creatures not sunonumos, univocally, nor homonumos, equivo-
cally, but analogos, analogically, so that they belong to God protos
and absolutely, to creatures deuteros and by way of dependence,
analogy being properly thus employed with reference to an intrinsic
--------------------End of Page 115-----------------------------------
attribute. The term univocal, properly and strictly speaking, be-
longs to such things as have the name and the thing denoted by
that name equally in common, no inequality interfering on account
of the dependence of the one upon the other; equivocal, to such as
have a common name but not the thing signified by the name;
analogical, to such as have both the name and the thing designated
by that name, but unequally, when the name and the thing belong
to the one protos and absolutely, but to the deuteros and by
way of dependence.") (Id., 293.)

(3) "But the predicate infinite expresses the peculiar conception;
for by this God, as an infinite Sprit, is distinguished from angels
and the sould of men, or finite spirits, and by this infinity of His
own, God transcends all the bounds of being, so that He cannot be
limited by time or place or any other thing, but, considered simply
in His own nature and essence, He is of Himself and absolutely
infinite. Nor do we speak of God as compounded, when we form
both a common and a peculiar conception concerning Him. For
that is a distinction of the reason only, and not a real one. (God
is infinite, not by virtue of quantitative extension, since He is de-
void of all quantity, but by virtue of essence and perfection.)"

The independence is thus explained by BR. (173): "For, as by
this, God is adequately distinguished from all other things, so
there is nothing that you can earlier conceive of in God, as a pecu-
liar and specific conception, than this, that He is not from another,
and so exists of Himself and necessarily. Proof-texts: Isaiah 44:6,
compared with Isaiah 41:4; Rev. 1:17."

The more popular definition of God (definitio Dei nominalis) is:
"By the term, God, is understood the first Being, because He is of
Himself and is the cause of all other things, and because He pre-
serves and governs all things;" concerning which HOLL. remarks
(187): "All men in the present life discover in themselves that
they do not and cannot otherwise conceive of God than as related
to created things, as the first Being, because from Him is the
cause of all other beings, and He preserves and governs all; or as
the Being most excellent of all, than whom nothing can be, or be
thought of as being. better or more perfect."

The earliest theologians, who did not as yet treat of the attributes
as a special topic, embrace them all, together with a notice of the
Trinity, in the definition of God. Thus MEL. (Loci Theol., I, 13):
"God is a spiritual essence, intelligent, eternal, true, good, pure,
just, merciful, most free, of vast power and wisdom, the eternal
Father who begat the Son, His own image, from eternity, and the
Son, the co-eternal image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit, pro-
-------------------------End of Page 116---------------------------
ceeding from the Father and the Son." Later theologians also
regard it as necessary to incorporate at once the Trinity in the defi-
nition of God. Thus CAL. says (II, 282): "Those who do not
include a statement of the three persons in the description of God
do not present that doctrine in a form at all genuine or complete,
since without these it does not yet appear what the true God is."
Compare, per contra, PARA. 19, preliminary note.

PARA. 18. (3.) The Attributes of God.

The doctrine of the attributes of God comprises only the
more specific description of the divine nature, as the same is
set forth in the Holy Scripture. [1] The attributes are,
therefore, not to be considred as something supplementary to
the essence of God, which may be laid aside without detriment
to the substance of God; [2] but in them we describe the di-
vine essence only according to its special features, because we
cannot otherwise conceive of it (they are thus variously char-
acterized on account of the feebleness of our conception).
Hence it also follows that the attributes are to be regarded as
unchangeable and permanent. [3]

We acquire our knowledge of the divine attributes, in gen-
eral, only from the Holy Scriptures, as has been already said,
and yet these are here taught, either only by way of popular
representation, or without any design of aiding us in construct-
ing a systematic doctrinal statement of the divine attributes.
To accomplish this, we must have recourse to other expedients.
A correct and exhaustive arrangement of the divine attributes
we may, however, attain, if, starting out with the proposition
that God is the Most Perfect Essence, we endeavor to enum-
erate all His perfections; inasmuch as the attributes of God
are nothing else than the description of the most perfect Es-
sence. These perfections we ascertain in a threefold way:

1. By ascribing to God, in the highest sense, all the perfec-
tions which we can discover in His creatures, inasmuch as no
perfection can be wanting to God of which we find creatures
possessed.

2.  By removing from our conception of God all imperfec-
tions which we observe in creatures, as nothing in any wise
imperfect can be ascribed to Him, and by attributing to Him
all the opposite perfections.
------------------------End of Page 117--------------------------
3. By ascribing to Him all the perfections which necessarily
must have belonged to one who was able to create and accom-
plish what God has done. It is, therefore, by the way of emi-
nence, [4] of negation, [5] and causality, [6] that we arrive at a
comprehensive knowledge of the divine attributes.

The attributes found in this way may be variously classified;
usually they are divided either into negative and positive
(HOLL. (237), "the former being those by which the imperfec-
tions found in creatures are removed from God; the latter,
those by which perfections are simply affirmed concerning
God;" or, into such as describe God as He is in Himself
and such as describe Him in His relation to the world). There-
fore, a. Attributes anenergeta, quiescent (which, viz., have no
specific reference to certain acts), or immanent, which describe
the divine essence absolutely and in itself, without reference
to an operation, and so directed towards no act; b. Attributes
energetika, or operative, and exerting themselves outwardly, hav-
ing reference to other things, which describe the divine es-
sence relatively, with reference to an operation, and so are
recognized as ordained for certain acts. [7] We follow the
former division, and arrange the attributes of God, therefore,
in the following manner:

BR. (174): I. The NEGATIVE are: unity, simplicity, immu-
tability, infinity, immensity, eternity.

1. "Unity; the attribute of God, by which we conceive the
divine essence to be absolutely single; not only undivided, but
also indivisible and incommunicable by any multiplication of
Himself." HOLL. (238) "Unity is ascribed to God, as well
absolutely, i.e., that the divine essence is undivided; as exclu-
sively, i.e., when we recognize God as one, beside whom there
is none other. Deut. 6:4; 4:35; 2 Kings 19:19." BR
(175). [8]

2. "Absolute Simplicity, by which God is truly and really
uncompounded (not compounded of matter and form, of in-
tegral parts, of subject and accident, of nature and subsistence).
Ex. 3:14." (Ibid.) ["Spirituality, John 4:24, is comprised
in Simplicity." QUEN. I, 286.]

3. "Immutability consists in this, that God is liable to no
change, either as to existence (inasmuch as He is immortal
--------------------End of Page 118---------------------------------
and incorruptible. Rom. 1:23; 1 Tim. 1: 17, 6:16), or as to
accidents (James 1:17), or as to place (Jer. 23:24), or us to
will or purpose (Numb. 23:19; Prov. 19:21; Mal. 3:6)."
BR. (176). [9]

"Immutability is the perpetual identity of the divine es-
sence and all its perfections, with the absolute negation of all
motion, either physical or ethical." QUEN. (I, 288).

4. "Infinity, because the essence of God is contained within
no bounds (either of time. of place, or of anything else). Ps.
145:3." BR. (177).

5. "The Immensity of God consists in this, that the divine
essence cannot be measured by, or included within, any local
limits. Jer. 23:24; 1 Kings 8:27." BR. (178).

"Immensity is the interminable ubiety, by virtue of which
God cannot but be everywhere, in His own essence, or it is the
absolute interminability of the divine essence. It flows from
infinity, which, with respect to time, is eternity, and, with re-
spect to space, is immensity." QUEN. (I, 288). From this
there follow: a, the power of being illocally present, absolutely
everywhere; b, the (ubiety and) omniprecence, by virtue of
which God is actually present to all His creatures." [10]

6. The Eternity of God, absolutely so called (for it does not
signify merely a very long time), indicated that the existence
or duration of God is permanent, without any beginning or
end, without succession or change. Ps. 102:27; 90:2; Gen.
21:33; Isaiah 40:28; 1 Tim. 1:17; Rev. 1:4 and 8, 11:17;
16:5." BR. (185).

II. THE POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES. BR. (174): "Life, knowl-
edge, wisdom, holiness, justice, truth, power, goodness, per-
fection."

1. Life. QUEN. (I, 289): "The attribute by which the di-
vine essence always shows itself active." [11]

2. Knowledge. QUEN. (I, 289): "By which He, through one
simple and eternal act of the intellect, knows all things what-
ever that have been, are, and shall be, or even in any way can
be. Nor only absolutely, but also that which is conditionally
future or possible. 1 Sam. 2:3; 1 John 3:20; 1 Kings 8:39;
Ps. 7:9; 34:15; 139:1; Pr. 15:3." [12]

3. "The Wisdom of God signifies that most accurate judg-
---------------------End of Page 119-----------------------------
ment of God, by which He knows how to dispose and ordain
all causes and effects in a most admirable manner for the at-
tainment of His end. Job 12:13; 28:20; Rom. 11:33."
BR. (191). [13]

"The Omnisapience of God is that, by which He most thor-
oughly penetrates all those things which infinitely surpass the
reach of human and angelic judgment." QUEN. (I, 290).

4. "Holiness, by which He, conformably to His own Law, de-
sires all things that are right and good. Deut. 32:4; Ps.
92:15; Lev. 11:44; 1 Pet. 1:15." BR. (200). [14]

"The holiness of God is the supreme purity in God, abso-
lutely free from all stain or vice, and requiring due cleanli-
ness and purity in creatures." QUEN. (I, 292).

5. Justice. "THe supreme and immutable rectitude of the
divine will, demanding from rational creatures that which is
right and just." QUEN. (I, 292).

"Justice is a divine attribute energetikon, by virtue of which
God wishes and does all those things which are conformed to
His eternal Law (Ps. 92:15), prescribes suitable laws to crea-
tures (Ps. 19:7), fulfils promises made to men (Is. 45:23), re-
wards the good (Rom. 2:5-7; 2 Thess. 1:6, 7), and punishes
the wicked (Ps. 119:137; Rom. 1:32; Acts 17:31; 2 Thess.
1:6; Rom. 3:8, 25)." HOLL. (268).

6. "Veracity, by which God is unfailing in speaking the
truth and keeping His promises. Numb. 23:19; Heb, 6:18;
Deut. 32:4." BR. (202).

7. Power. "The divine attribute by which God can accom-
plish everything that can possibly be done without implying
an imperfection in God." HOLL. (272).

"Power is that by which God independently, through the
eternal activity of His own essence, can do absolutely every-
thing that does not involve a contradiction. Matt. 19:26;
Luke 1:37; 18:27; Eph. 3:20." QUEN. (I, 293). [15]

8 and 9. "Goodness belongs to God, not only absolutely and
in itself, which is His very perfection, or the essence of God,
since He contains within Himself all perfections (Matt. 5:48;
Luke 18:19), either formally or by way of eminence; but also,
respectively or in relation to creatures, to whom God is good,
since He efficiently produces every created good (Acts 17:
--------------------End of Page 120----------------------------
25, 28; James 1:17; 1 Cor. 4:7), and this according to His
own perfection, as the ideal or pattern of created perfection;
and it attracts also, and excites to the love and desire of Him-
self as the chief good." BR. (205). [16]

[1] QUEN. (I, 284): "Attributes are nothing else than inade-
quate conceptions of the divine essence, involving in part the
essence itself of the object, and inwardly designating the same.
Inasmuch as our finite intellect cannot adequately conceive of the
infinite and most simple essence of God by a single adequate con-
ception, therefore it apprehends the same by distinct and inade-
quate conceptions, inadequately representing the divine essence
which inadequate conceptions are called the affections and attributes of
God; affections, because they designate the divine essence; attri-
butes, because they are attributed to the same by our intellect."

HOLL. (234): "The attributes of God are called perfections, be-
cause they most perfectly declare God's essence."

[2] CHMN. (Loc. Th. I,29): "An accident does not belong to
God....By an accident, that is meant which can either be lost,
or can be added to a substance before existing, or can depart while
the substance itself remains."

CAL. (II, 221): "The attributes are by no means accidental,
but, on the part of the object, they are the essence of God itself,
regarded under various modes or respects of consideration, since
essentials are usually referred to by that name. For if they were
accidents, they would add a new entity or perfection, and the
essence of God would not of itself be complete. If they were to be-
long to God in the manner of accidents, God's essence would not
be altogether immutable, because liable to accidents."

QUEN. (I, 296): "Before any operation of our intellect, divine
attributes are truly and properly in God; yet they are not accidents,
nor are they predicated of God in the manner of inherence or com-
position." And this is further explained by the following: (I,
297): "The divine attributes do not denote anything superadded
to the divine essence, but are only inadequate conceptions of an in-
finitely perfect essence. The divine essence is like a boundless
ocean of all infinite perfections, which the huiman intellect has not
the ability to exhaust, by one single conception, and, therefore, by
means of various conceptions, draws drop by drop, as it were,
something from that infinity." (Ibid.) "The divine attributes
imply the divine essence itself, which we apprehend now with this
and then with another perfection, as if we would distribute the
essence itself into a number of conceptions, representing the same
-------------------End of Page 121--------------------------------
essence inadequately, inasmuch as our finite intellect cannot at the
same time distinctly recognize its infinite perfections."

Hence follow the proposition (GRH. III, 84): "The divine attri-
butes, considered in and of themselves, are really and absolutely one
with the divine essense." CAL. (II, 222): "IF they really differed
from the essence after the manner of accidents, a composition in
God would be predicated; and since, by nature, accidents come
after essence, former and latter in the order of nature would have
a place in God, both of which are contrary to the faith. If they
were to be actually distinguished, they would not be predicated in
the abstract of God, who in the abstract is said to be truth, life,
love. If God's power were to differ from His essence, God would
not be autexousios, i.e., powerful in Himself, but on account of the
power superadded to His essence."

There is, indeed, a certain difference between essence and attri-
butes, otherwise they would not be separately treated. This dis-
tinction is thus stated by QUEN. (I, 300): "The essential attributes
of God are distinguished neither from the divine essence nor from
each other really, or from the nature of the object, as matters alto-
gether diverse, or as two or more different objects or diverse modes
of one and the same simple object, but they are so distinguished
only to the reason."

A distinction from the nature of the object, would occur if the
objects were different, as body and soul; but a distinction from
reason occurs, when anything is only conceived of as distinct,
although it is not distinct in fact. HOLL. (235) expresses this
distinction thus: "Divine attributes are distinguished from the
divine essence and from each other not nominally, nor really, but
formally, according to our mode of conceiving, not without a cer-
tain foundation of distinction." To wit: not "nominally" because
"divine attributes imply distinct conceptions, therefore they differ
more than nominally" nor "really," because "the divine essence
is most simple, destitute of all real composition" but "formally,"
etc., "because we form single conceptions of the operations of the
single attributes, although they do not exist separately in the
divine nature."

[3] GRH. (III, 84): "The attributes exist inseparably in God;
for, as it is impossible that the essence of an object be separated
from the object itself, so also the attributes cannot be separated
from God, since they are the very essence of God."

[4] HOLL. (190): "By way of eminence, according to which
whatever we discover in creatures to be especially perfect, we
ascribe in the most eminent manner to God, by virtue of the very
-----------------End of Page 122--------------------------------
familiar principle in nature: `Whatever exists in an effect, pre-
exists in the cause.' From which we infer that all perfections
which are in creatures, are in the Creator, either formally or by
way of eminence. For indeed, in creatures, such perfections shine
forth absolutely, as involve in their formal conception no imper-
fection, but are better than the creatures themselves. Thus we
notice in men, the most eminent of visible creatures, the power to
understand and to will, wisdom, goodness, justice, etc. These
perfections exist formally, and, indeed, in the most excellent man-
ner, in God."

While here perfections are ascribed to God which in a certain
sense can be predicated also of a creature, GRH. (III, 86) appends
the twofold remark: (1) That we must be careful to observe that
they belong to man only secondarily, but to God originally....
"Of God they are predicated essentially, exochikos, and, therefore,
altogether in a peculiar way; of certain creatures only accidentally
and through a participation and resemblance: of God they are
predicated in the abstract; of creatures, only in the concrete. The
goodness of God not only belongs to God essentially, and is itself
the essence of God, but also in the cause and rule of goodness in
man." (2) That those attributes which in the case of man ex-
press an affection, when ascribed also to God do not indicate a
wakness or mutability like that of the creature, in accordance
with the principle (ibid): "Whatever things are transferred from
creatures to God must first be freed from all imperfections, and
then only, as that which is perfect, are they to be ascribed to God."
(I, 110): "Nor do those affections which Scripture ascribes to
God prove any mutability of the divine essence; for those things
which are spoken of anthropopathos, must be understood theoprepos."

CHMN. (Loc. Th., 29): "It is objected that some things are
affirmed of God with respect to time: as, `the Word was made
flesh,' and became for us a Creator, an aid in times of trouble, and
a refuge. Therefore, all this is predicated of God accidentally.
Cyril replies: `With respect to creatures, some things are affirmed
of God under the limitations of time; and these are affirmed acci-
dentally,' not because anything happens, with change, to God's
substance, but as an accident of the creature in which the change
occurs."

[5] HOLL. (191): "By way of negation, according to which we
remove from God whatever implies imperfection in creatures, and
ascribe to Him an opposite perfection, according to the self-evident
principle of nature, that there is no defect in that which is supremely
perfect. Relying upon this principle of nature, we call God in-
----------------End of Page 123-------------------------------------------
dependent, infinite, incorporeal, immense, immortal, incompre-
hensible."

[6] HOLL. (190): "By way of causality, according to which we
recognize from the effects an efficient First Cause; from creatures, a
Creator; and from the most beautiful and wise government of this
universe, a most excellent, most powerful, and most wise Preserver
and Governor. Here an argument is derived from the very evi-
dent axiom: An effect is proved from the cause, and its perfection."
N.B. Except in the writings of GRH., we find the method adopted
after the time of Dionysius only incidentally noticed, it is true;
and HOLL. mentions it barely as that by which we can acquire a
natural knowledge of God: but we may with good reason assign it
this place; for, although it is not questioned that we obtain a
clearer and more comprehensive knowledge of the divine attributes
from revelation than natural knowledge teaches, yet we cannot be-
lieve ourselves limited, with regard to the divine attributes, to the
Holy Scriptures in such a way as only to have the single attributes
enumerated for us out of the Scriptures, but we must rather be
able from them to form for ourselves such a conception of the Di-
vine Essence that we may from it deduce the attributes; and
thus, from the standpoint of revelation itself, this threefold way of
eminence can be evolved.

[7] GRH. (III, 85) enumerates still other distributions: "(1)
Some attributes are predicated at the same time of God and of crea-
tures, such as those by which things are signified which in creatures
are accidents, but in God are substances, as when God is said to be
good, wise; but others are predicated of God alone, as those by which
things which belong to God alone are explained, as when He is
said to be eternal, infinite. (2) Some attributes are attributes to
God properly, as that He is good, wise, etc.; others improperly and
figuratively, when, by anthropopathy, human members and affec-
tions are ascribed to Him. (3) Some are affirmed of God in the
abstract, as when He is said to be life, goodness, truth; others in the
concrete, as when He is said to be living, good, and true. (4) Some
are internal, as infinity, eternity, spirituality; others are external, and
these are either inimitable, as omnipotence, etc., or imitable. (5)
Some belong to God from eternity, as that He is infinite; others
belong to Him in time, as that He is the Creator and Preserver, yet
these, as relative terms, do not prove any change made in God Him-
self in time, but denote that a new work has been produced by
Him, and that a change has been made in creatures."

Those Dogmaticians who divide the attributes into immanent and
externally operative, usually cite a greater number. CALOV. (II,
--------------------End of Page 124------------------------------------
233, seq.) thus enumberates them: "I. The immanent attributes
pertain either to essence, or infinity, or spirituality. To the essence
belong God's perfection (and thence, majesty and happiness), unity
(and thence, simplicity), truth (and thence, immutability), good-
ness, holiness. To infinity belong immensity, eternity. To spir-
ituality, immortality, life (intellect, will). II. To the attributes
exerting themselves outwardly belong omnipotence, omniscience, grace,
justice, truth, omnipresence."

[8] HOLL. (238): "God is said to be one, not in kind, but in
number, since He is a being entirely alone, not only in Himself
undivided, but also indivisible, because of the entire simplicity of
the divine essence, as there is no composition in God."

GRH. is the only one of the Dogmaticians who considers unity as
not an attribute, but as a characteristic, of the divine essence. For
the relation of the unity of God to the Trinity, see PARA. 19.

[9] GRH. (I, 124): "But did the work of creation change God,
or make Him changeable? By no means; for in time He did that
which, from eternity, He had decreed in His immutable will."

[10] GRH. (III, 122): "The immensity and essential omnipres-
ence of God is thus to be understood (1), that God is present to
all things, not only by virtue and efficacy, nor only by sight and
knowledge, but also in His entire and individual esssence, for He is
immense and infinite, not only in power and knowledge, but also in essence;
(2), that God is everywhere present, not sunektos, so as to be com-
prehended, but sunektikos, so as to comprehend and contain all things;
not periektos and perigraptos, but periektikos. The Scholastics say that
God is everywhere, not locally or by way of circumscription,...
nor definitively,...but repletively;* yet this must not be un-
derstood in a gross and corporeal manner, that God fills all places
just as a body which fills its own place in such a manner as to hin-
der another body from beihg located in the place which it occupies,
but in a divine manner, that God, being confined to no place be-
cause of the immensity of His essence, contains all places; (3), that
God is everywhere present, not by the multiplication of His essence,
for He is olos olon ti, a most simple being, and, therefore, whatever
He is He is entire, neither by the division of His essence,...nor
by extension and rarefaction,...nor by commingling;...(4),
that God is, by His essence, everywhere present, not subjectively,
as an accident inheres in a subject, because God is neither compo-
site, nor can He admit of composition,...but that He is effect-
ively present as the source and cause of the thing which He effects;
for God is not contained in a place, but rather gives to place and
----------------------------------------------------------------------
*See Appendix II, under Circumscriptio.
--------------------End of Page 125-----------------------------------------
the things that are in place their own existence. The presence is
(a), illocal; (b), indivisible; (c), incomprehensible to our reason;
(d), effective and operative; (e), containing within itself all things,
like a most minute point.

HOLL. (275): "God's omnipresence is a divine enerngptikon attri-
bute, by virtue of which God is present to all creatures, not only
by the nearness of His substance, but also by His efficacious work-
ing. The divine presence, according to the Scriptural idiom and
its complex meaning, implies two things (1), adiastasia, or the sub-
stantial presence of God with creatures; (2), energeia, or effectual
operation. Therefore, two things are here to be proved: (a), that
God, with respect to His substance, is everywhere present; (b), to
a full and accurate definition of the divine presence, the effectual
operation also of God as a definitive part is required by the light of
the Holy Scripture."

[11] QUEN. (I, 289): "God is life (1), essentially, for He is
autozoos, having life en heauto (John 5:26), i.e., in Himself and of
Himself, by His own nature and essence; (2), energetikos, effectively,
because He is to all the cause and origin of life, or He is the life of
all that  live, not formally, but causally. (Acts 17:28; Deut. 32:
39.)" This is negatively expressed by immortality. 1 Tim. 6:
16, and incorruptibility, Rom. 1:23; 1 Tim. 1:17.

[12] QUEN. (I, 289): "Although the knowledge of God is one
and simple, and cannot be separated into parts or species, yet, with
respect to objects, a manifold distinction is generally observed.
This distinction is (1) into natural, or that of simple intelligence,
and free, or that of sight. The former, which is called also abstract
and indefinite, is that by which God knows Himself, and not only
those things which are, which have been, or are about to be, but
also all possible things, viz., those which can happen and exist,
although they never will happen or exist; yea, He is acquainted
even with those things which are impossible. The latter, viz., the
knowledge of free vision, which is called both intuitive and definite,
is that by which God regards all things as present, sees Himself in
Himself, and all other things which at any time have existed, or
now exist, or will truly exist, both in Himself, as in the universal
cause, and in their proximate causes and in themselves. The
Scholastics add a third, and name it mediate, according to which
they say that God is acquainted with those things which can exist,
with the condition interposed that it is limited to that which the
creatures, if created with certain conditions, would be free to do,
or would be allowed to effect. Natural knowledge precedes every
free act of the will. Free knowledge is said to follow a free act of
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the will. Mediate knowledge is said indeed to precede an act of
the will, yet in such a manner that it sees something as future only
on the hypothesis of such will.

[13] BR. (191 and 192) discusses the topic of the will of God, not
as a separate attribute, as many Dogmaticians do, but as supple-
mentary to the attribute of wisdom; and from the will of God de-
duces the attributes of holiness, justice and truth.

HOLL. (261): "The will of God is the divine essence itself, con-
ceived of under the mode of power, seeking the good and shunning
the evil that is known by the intellect."

The name of the divine will is more particularly described as
follows:

BR. (193): "The will of God is distinguished into natural and
free. According to the former, God is said to will that which He is
not able not to will. According to the latter, He is said to will that
which He was able also not to will, or to will the opposite. Accord-
ing to the former manner, He is said to will Himself; according to
the latter manner, created things."

HOLL. (262): "You say: The necessity to will and love Himself
seems to be an imperfection in God, both because it is like the mode
of operation of natural agents, which is imperfect, and also because
freedom is a greater perfection than necessity. Reply: Necessity in
acting is threefold. One kind is violent, which is from without. A
second is natural, which is, indeed, from within, yet is inanimate or
at least irrational. Both are imperfect. A third is natural, vital,
and in the highest degree voluntary. This is a great perfection, and
such a necessity to will and love exists in God in respect to that
which is a supreme and infinite good. Yea, this necessity is more
perfect than the freedom to which it is opposed."

BR. (194): "The free will of God is distinguished as: (1) effi-
cacious and inefficacious. That is efficacious by which God wills
something to be effected. Inefficacious is that by which something
in itself please God, although He does not intend to effect it. The
efficacious will again is divided into absolute, by which God wills
something without a condition; and conditional, by which He wills
something under a condition; (2) absolute, by which He wills
that something be effected by His own absolute power, or by His
power as not bound by second causes; and ordinate, by which He
wills that something be effected by His own ordinate power, or by
His power as bound to second causes and to a certain order of means
appointed by Himself; (3) first or antecedent, by which He wills
something from Himself alone, or entirely from His own inclina-
tion, without any regard being had to the circumstances; and second
-------------------End of Page 127------------------------------------
or consequent, by which He wills something with a consideration of
the circumstances, or in consideration of a cause or condition, re
garded with respect to the creature for which He wills something."

BR. (198): "A distinction of the divine will also occurs, into a
will of the sign and of the purpose. The former is meant when the
name, will, is ascribed to an effect or object of the divine will, namely
as a sign of the will in God.* The latter denotes the act itself of the
divine will, by which it wills anything. Whence it is manifest that
the distinction is analogical. But we must take care not to imagine
such a will of the sign as to conflict with the will of the purpose which
the sign, according to the plan, ought to signify."

[14] HOLL. (246): "God is holy, (1) independently and by His
essence: creatures dependently and through a quality superadded
to the essence; (2) immutably, inasmuch as the holiness of God
cannot fail, or undergo a change like that of a creature, James 1:
17; (3) efficiently, because He is the author of all holiness, 1 Thess.
5:23; (4) by way of example, since the holiness of God is the model
of all holiness, which the holy sons of God perpetually contemplate
and imitate. This imitation the Heavenly Father demands of
them, Lev. 11:44; cf. Lev. 19:2; 1 Pet. 1:17; (5) objectively, be-
cause the holiness of God must be sacredly recognized and cele-
brated by us, Is. 6:3."

[15] QUEN. (I, 293): "The objects of the divine omnipotence
are not only such things as God wills to do, but also such as are in
any way possible, and therefore, all those things which do not in-
volve contradiction, as (1) such as have no mode of existence.
Thus God is unable to render a deed undone; (2) such as imply a
fault or defect, as to be able to lie, to sin, to die. For to do such
things is not a proof of power, but of impotence. The potentia of
God is not separated from divine potestas, dunamis, from exousia,*! as
the Calvinists wish; for, although these can be distinctly conceived
of, and among other things outside of God have frequently been
separated, yet in God they are most intimately joined, and are one
and the same thing."

"Although divine power is unique, yet because of its different
relations, it can be distinguished into absolute, by which God can
most absolutely effect whatever can exist; and ordinate, which the
accustomed government of the universe displays. By the former,
God can frame a new world, from the stones raise up children to
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[*As illustrations, he cites Matt. 6:15; 12:50, and especially
1 Thess. 4:3.]
*!{"Potentia denotes a merely factitious power, which can be exerted at will,
like dunamis; potestas, a just and lawful power, with which a person is
intrusted, like exousia."--Doederlein's Latin Synonyms.]
---------------End of Page 128------------------------------------------------
Abraham (Matt. 3:9); the latter preserves the order established in
nature. By this absolute power God can do many things, which,
nevertheless, He does not do by His ordinary power."

[16] HOLL. (245): "The goodness of God is the conformity of the
divine essence to the divine will." It has been distinguished into
essential goodness, or perfection, and moral goodness, or holiness.
--------------------End of Chapter on Page 129----------------------------


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